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Non-technical Summary 
Google, Apple and other highly profitable multinationals are able to drastically reduce their tax 
burden on worldwide income by shifting profits from high- to low-tax countries. Reports on 
these tax avoidance strategies have triggered an intense public debate, which has brought the 
issue to the top of the international policy agenda. Both the OECD and the EU-Commission are 
currently working on measures to fight tax avoidance and profit shifting by multinational firms 
and have already published first recommendations. 
This paper contributes to the current debate in two ways: First, we provide background 
information for a better understanding of the issue. Second, we discuss different policy options 
to address tax avoidance and profit shifting by multinationals and derive recommendations for 
policy makers. As most companies currently accused of avoiding taxes use intra-group 
licensing to shift profits, we focus on IP-based profit shifting but do also elaborate on profit 
shifting in general. 
Based on a detailed description of exemplary tax planning strategies of multinational firms, we 
reveal central flaws and loopholes in tax law. Moreover, we show that there is solid empirical 
evidence demonstrating that profit shifting is indeed taking place but little is known about the 
tax revenue consequences of profit shifting. 
With respect to the policy options, we differentiate between four general approaches for 
tackling profit shifting and tax avoidance by multinational firms: 
(1) Extension of residence taxation 
(2) Extension of source taxation 
(3) Fundamental reforms of corporate income taxation 
(4) Stricter reporting and transparency requirements 
We argue that strengthening residence taxation, for example by tightening CFC rules, is an 
effective reform option but has the disadvantage that some countries benefit from a weak 
residence taxation and, hence, might be reluctant to move in this direction. Enforcing source 
taxation, on the other hand, is more promising. In the short run, we especially recommend 
extending withholding taxes in an internationally coordinated way. This measure effectively 
tackles profit shifting without causing double taxation. Unilateral measures for strengthening 
source taxation, like for example deduction restriction rules for interest and license payments 
or a general anti-avoidance measures, are not recommended because the first are economically 
harmful and the second are presumably ineffective. For the longer perspective, we recommend 
the more fundamental reform options, like formula apportionment or a destination-based tax, 
to be further promoted. Stricter reporting and transparency requirements, like country-by-
country reporting, do face serious legal constraints and it is questionable whether the benefit of 
such rules justifies the corresponding effort and costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Google, Apple und anderen hochprofitablen multinationalen Konzernen gelingt es, ihre 
weltweite Steuerbelastung durch die Verlagerung von Gewinnen in Niedrigsteuerländer 
drastisch zu senken. Berichte über diese Steuervermeidungspraktiken haben eine intensive 
öffentliche Debatte ausgelöst und die internationale Politik zum Handeln veranlasst. Sowohl 
die OECD als auch die EU-Kommission arbeiten derzeit an Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung von 
Steuervermeidung und Gewinnverlagerung durch multinationale Unternehmen und haben 
bereits erste Empfehlungen veröffentlicht. 
Dieses Diskussionspapier leistet in zweierlei Hinsicht einen Beitrag zur aktuellen Debatte: Zum 
einen geben wir Hintergrundinformationen, die zu einem besseren Verständnis der Problematik 
beitragen sollen. Zum anderen diskutieren wir verschiedene Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung 
internationaler Gewinnverlagerung und geben Handlungsempfehlungen. Da die meisten der 
derzeit aufgrund ihrer Steuerplanungsstrategien in der Kritik stehenden Unternehmen Gewinne 
durch gruppeninterne Lizenzierungsgestaltungen verschieben, gehen wir insbesondere auf 
diese Form der Gewinnverlagerung ein. 
Basierend auf einer detaillierten Beschreibung typischer Steuerplanungsstrategien 
multinationaler Konzerne decken wir die zentralen Schwachstellen und Schlupflöcher im 
bestehenden Steuersystem auf. Zudem zeigen wir, dass ein Gewinnverlagerungsverhalten 
multinationaler Unternehmen empirisch erwiesen ist, jedoch nur wenig über die Auswirkungen 
von Gewinnverlagerung auf das Steueraufkommen bekannt ist.  
Bei der Diskussion der Handlungsalternativen unterscheiden wir zwischen vier grundlegenden 
Ansätzen zur Bekämpfung von Steuervermeidung und Gewinnverlagerung durch 
multinationale Konzerne: 
(1) Ausweitung der Wohnsitzbesteuerung 
(2) Ausweitung der Quellenbesteuerung 
(3) Fundamentale Reformen der Körperschaftsteuer 
(4) Strengere Berichts- und Transparenzanforderungen 
Wir argumentieren, dass eine Stärkung der Wohnsitzbesteuerung, zum Beispiel durch eine 
Verschärfung von Regelungen zur Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung, eine effektive Reformoption 
darstellt, die jedoch nur schwer durchsetzbar sein dürfte, da einige Länder von einer schwachen 
Wohnsitzbesteuerung profitieren. Eine Stärkung der Quellenbesteuerung ist 
vielversprechender. Als kurzfristige Maßnahme empfehlen wir insbesondere eine international 
koordinierte Ausweitung der Erhebung von Quellensteuern. Diese Maßnahme bekämpft 
effektiv Gewinnverlagerung ohne eine Doppelbesteuerung auszulösen. Unilaterale 
Maßnahmen zur Stärkung der Quellenbesteuerung, wie Abzugsbeschränkungen für Zins- und 
Lizenzzahlungen oder generelle Anti-Missbrauchs Vorschriften, sind hingegen nicht 
empfehlenswert, da erstere ökonomisch schädlich und letztere nur wenig effektiv sind. 
Langfristig erachten wir es als sinnvoll, fundamentalere Reformmaßnahmen, wie z.B. eine 
formelhafte Gewinnaufteilung oder eine am Bestimmungsland anknüpfende Steuer, weiter 
voranzutreiben. Strengeren Berichts- und Transparenzanforderungen, wie z. B. country-by-
country reporting, stehen rechtliche Beschränkungen entgegen und es ist fraglich, ob der Nutzen 
solcher Maßnahmen die dadurch entstehenden Kosten und den resultierenden Aufwand 
rechtfertigt.  
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1. Introduction 
Recent media reports have drawn attention to the fact that some highly profitable multinational 
companies seem to pay almost no corporate income tax on host country income. The effective 
tax rates on foreign profits of Google Inc. and Apple Inc., for example, have been reported to 
be 3% and 1%, respectively.1 This has triggered an intense public debate about profit shifting 
and tax avoidance by multinational firms. Given that many countries face high levels of debt 
and huge pressure to generate tax revenue, it is not surprising that this debate has brought the 
taxation of multinational firms to the top of the international policy agenda.  
The G20 leaders stressed the need to take action against multinational profit shifting and tax 
avoidance at the Summit in Los Cabos in June 2012. On 12 February 2013 the OECD published 
its report “Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting”2, which summarizes the interim 
findings of the OECD´s ongoing work in this field and identifies key pressure areas. A 
subsequent global action plan of the OECD with 15 actions was released on 19 July 2013.3 The 
deadlines for elaborating concrete recommendations on how to address these actions are 
September 2014, September 2015 and December 2015 respectively. The European Commission 
has also started to deal with the issue. On 6 December 2012 the Commission adopted an action 
plan4 and two recommendations5 to combat tax fraud, tax evasion and aggressive tax planning. 
Moreover, at the EU Summit on 22 May 2013, the European Council agreed to accelerate the 
work on recommendations against tax fraud, tax evasion and aggressive tax planning and 
announced to report back on progress on these topics by December 2013.6 Finally, there is an 
ongoing academic7 and political debate in many countries on how profit shifting and aggressive 
tax planning might be tackled.8 
The fact that some multinationals are able to drastically reduce their tax liability by exploiting 
flaws and loopholes in existing tax rules does suggest that the taxation of multinational firms is 
in need of reform. It is the objective of this article to (1) explain how profit shifting in 
multinational companies works and (2) discuss policy options to address this issue. We do so 
                                                            
1   Sullivan (2012) p. 655. 
2   OECD (2013a). 
3   OECD (2013b). 
4   European Commission (2012a). 
5   European Commission (2012b); European Commission (2012c). 
6   European Council (2013). 
7   For tax reform proposals see, e.g., Mirrlees et al. (eds.) (2010); Kleinbard (2011a); Kleinbard (2011b). 
8   See, e.g., in Germany: Fraktionen SPD und BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN (2013).  
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by focusing on profit shifting which involves the use of intellectual property (IP)9 because this 
asset class has two important characteristics: Firstly, it is a driver of value creation in 
multinational firms. Secondly, IP is highly mobile. These characteristics imply that IP plays an 
important role in international profit shifting. It is no surprise that most of the companies 
currently accused of avoiding taxes have highly profitable and IP intensive business models. 
Of course, this does not mean that other channels like e.g. intra-group debt financing are 
unimportant. Therefore, the policy options discussed in the following address profit shifting in 
general and specific IP tax planning strategies in particular.  
There are many ways in which policymakers can try to combat tax avoidance and profit shifting. 
For the following discussion it is helpful to distinguish four approaches: 
(1) Extension of residence-based taxation for example by tightening CFC rules. 
(2) Extension of source-based taxation. This can be achieved, firstly, through unilateral 
measures or, secondly, through measures requiring international coordination. The first 
approach includes, for instance, targeted measures like thin capitalization rules. An 
example for the second approach is the extension of withholding taxes on border 
crossing interest or royalty payments.  
(3) Fundamental reform of corporate income taxation. This includes reform concepts like 
the introduction of worldwide formula apportionment or destination-based corporate 
taxation.  
(4) A reform of the reporting and transparency rules in international taxation like the 
obligation for tax advisers to report tax avoidance schemes or country-by-country 
reporting of multinational investors. 
Approach 1 can be effective but has the disadvantage that some countries benefit from certain 
forms of profit shifting and therefore may not be willing to extend their own residence-based 
taxation. In addition, from the perspective of an individual country extending residence-based 
taxation addresses tax avoidance related to foreign subsidiaries of domestic multinationals but 
not tax avoidance by domestic subsidiaries of foreign parent companies. With respect to 
approach 2, unilateral measures have the attractive feature that, by definition, no international 
                                                            
9   In line with the OECD definition we denote by the term IP the rights to use industrial assets such as patents, 
trademarks, trade names, designs or models etc. Such commercial IP can be classified into trade IP and marketing 
IP. While trade IP (e.g. patents) often is created through costly and risky research and development (R&D) 
activities, marketing IP (e.g. trademarks) serves the commercial exploitation of a product or service, etc. See OECD 
(2010). 
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coordination is required. The drawback is that this will often lead to double taxation and is 
likely to undermine the consistency of the national as well as the international tax system. If 
multilateral measures are taken, approach 2 would be an effective way of pushing back tax 
avoidance. Of course, here again the challenge is that different countries may have very 
different interests. Approach 3, a fundamental reform of international corporate taxation, is 
desirable but clearly a long-term project. Approach 4 may help but raises a number of 
complicated issues.  
The rest of this article is organized as follows: First, in section 2., we describe exemplary 
arrangements for IP-based profit shifting which are used in this or comparable forms by the 
companies currently accused of avoiding taxes. We do so to identify the distinct elements of 
taxation rendering such strategies possible. In section 3. we elaborate on the actual significance 
of the problem of profit shifting by providing an overview of empirical studies on the extent 
and forms of multinational profit shifting. Following this, in section 4., we briefly explain how 
we would like international taxation to work. In section 5. we discuss different policy options 
to address profit shifting and section 6. concludes.  
 
2. Prominent Models for IP-Based Profit Shifting 
The companies that are known to drastically reduce their tax liability all own firm-specific 
intellectual property and shift profits via intra-group licensing. Hence, we focus on IP-based 
profit shifting strategies here and do not elaborate on other profit shifting channels. However, 
the policy options discussed in section 5. also address certain other tax planning strategies. 
Although multinationals do not all use exactly the same techniques for shifting income via 
licensing, the strategies they apply follow similar patterns. In the following, we therefore 
present two exemplary IP-based tax planning strategies and identify the central flaws and 
loopholes in national and international tax law rendering these tax avoidance strategies possible.  
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2.1. “Double Irish Dutch Sandwich” 
The tax planning technique that for example Google Inc. has been using to reduce its tax liability 
on non-US income has become known as “Double Irish Dutch Sandwich”.10 As its name 
implies, the “Double Irish Dutch Sandwich” involves two companies incorporated in Ireland, 
one IP-Holding and one Operating Company, and one Conduit Company incorporated in the 
Netherlands.11 The IP-Holding Company is a direct subsidiary of the US Parent Company and 
the single owner of the Irish Operating Company and the Dutch Conduit Company. The IP-
Holding is managed and controlled in Bermuda and therefore considered resident in Bermuda 
for Irish tax purposes. The United States, on the contrary, treats the company as an Irish 
corporation because tax residency is based on jurisdiction of incorporation according to US tax 
law. 
 
 
Figure 1: “Double Irish Dutch Sandwich” 
                                                            
10  Google Inc. now seems to use a slightly different structure. However, the “Double Irish Dutch Sandwich” or 
single elements of it are used by other multinationals as well and the structure serves as a good example to illustrate 
important features of IP-based tax planning. For the statement on Google´s new strategy see House of Commons 
(2012). 
11  For a detailed description of the structure see also Kleinbard (2011a) pp. 707-714; Sandell (2012); Pinkernell 
(2012). 
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Figure 1 summarizes the structure. In the following the single steps and elements of the “Double 
Irish Dutch Sandwich” are explained in detail. 
 
(1) Low tax payment on the initial IP transfer 
To set up the structure, the US Parent Company first has to transfer the rights to use its IP 
outside the US to the IP-Holding Company. As transferring the full-fledged intangible would 
trigger taxation of hidden reserves and future income generated by the intangible according to 
the US super royalty rule,12 the IP-Holding Company typically makes a buy-in payment and 
concludes a cost-sharing agreement on the future modification and enhancement of the IP with 
the US Parent Company. Consequently, the IP-Holding owns the non-US IP rights developed 
under the cost-sharing agreement and therefore no periodic license payments have to be made 
to the US Parent Company. Determining the arm´s length price for the buy-in payment is 
usually very difficult as the intangible is only partially developed at the time of transfer and risk 
is associated with future earnings. Hence, multinationals have considerable leeway in 
determining the price and are often able to avoid high exit taxes.13  
 
(2) Almost no taxation in the country of final consumption  
The Irish Operating Company exploits the IP and usually earns high revenues. In Google´s case 
the Operating Company provides advertising services and acts as the contractual partner of all 
non-US customers. Hence, no physical presence is created in the country of final consumption 
and the profits cannot be taxed there. The same holds also for other e-commerce businesses that 
use the “Double Irish Dutch Sandwich”.14 Functions in the customers’ residence states like the 
delivery of products or marketing activities are usually assigned to low-risk group companies. 
These group service providers work on a cost-plus basis keeping the tax base in the country of 
final consumption low.  
 
 
                                                            
12  According to this rule, transfer prices determined at the time of transfer that are not commensurate with the 
income attributable to the intangible may be adjusted later on. 
13  According to the US cost-sharing regulations, also buy-in payments can be adjusted if the profit of a participant 
in the cost-sharing agreement turns out to be too high relative to payments. However, there are exceptions to this 
and similar adjustment rules and their application seems to be avoidable.  
14  We particularly refer to e-commerce businesses here because e-commerce is an increasingly important form of 
mobile activity. However, to be clear, low taxation in the country of final consumption is not exclusively 
attributable to e-commerce. Also “on-the-ground” businesses like Starbucks are able to erode their tax base by 
using similar licensing structures as well as other profit shifting channels, for details see, e.g., Kleinbard (2013). 
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(3) Setting high royalty payments reduces taxation at the level of the Operating Company  
The profits from customer sales earned by the Operating Company are subject to tax in Ireland. 
However, the tax base of the Operating Company is close to zero because it pays high tax-
deductible royalties for the use of the IP held by the IP-Holding Company. As Ireland has only 
recently introduced transfer pricing rules and these rules do not apply to contracts and terms 
agreed on before July 2010, most companies using the “Double Irish Dutch Sandwich” are able 
to erode the tax base in Ireland by paying very high royalty payments. 
 
(4) Interposition of Dutch Conduit Company to avoid withholding taxes on profits leaving the 
European Union 
The royalties are not paid directly to the IP-Holding Company but are passed through a Conduit 
Company in the Netherlands, which sublicenses the IP. The Dutch Conduit Company does not 
perform any economic activity. It is interposed because the IP-Holding Company is a Bermuda 
resident for Irish tax purposes and Ireland levies withholding tax on royalty payments to 
Bermuda. By channeling the royalties through the Dutch Conduit Company, withholding taxes 
can be completely circumvented as royalties paid from Ireland to the Netherlands are tax-free 
under the EU Interest and Royalties Directive and the Netherlands does not impose withholding 
tax on any royalty payments, irrespective of the residence state of the receiving company. The 
tax liability of the Conduit Company in the Netherlands only consists of a small fee payable for 
the use of the Dutch tax system. 
 
(5) IP-Holding Company untaxed in Ireland and Bermuda 
The IP-Holding Company is neither subject to tax in Ireland nor in Bermuda since Ireland 
considers the company a non-resident and Bermuda does not impose income tax on 
corporations. Hence, the profits earned in the European Union leave the European Union 
virtually untaxed. 
 
(6) US CFC rules are circumvented 
The United States also does not tax the non-US income as long as it is not redistributed as 
dividends or qualified as Subpart F income. To avoid the latter, the Irish Operating Company 
and the Dutch Conduit Company file a check-the-box election with the consequence that both 
Irish subsidiaries and the Dutch Conduit Company are treated as one single Irish corporation 
and their incomes are combined for US tax purposes. The royalty payments between the 
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companies thus are disregarded and only revenues from transactions with customers, which due 
to exceptions included in the Subpart F provisions typically do not constitute Subpart F income, 
are considered from a US perspective. 
 
2.2. IP-Holding Structure Using an IP Box Regime 
The “Double Irish Dutch Sandwich” is only one example for how IP-Holdings can be used to 
minimize taxes. Another possibility is to transfer the IP to an IP-Holding Company resident in 
a European country that offers a special IP Box Regime, like for example Luxembourg, 
Belgium or the United Kingdom. The Operating Company can generally be resident in any EU 
Member State. However, locating it in a country that does not strictly apply the arm´s length 
principle allows increasing the amount of profits shifted. As in the case of the “Double Irish 
Dutch Sandwich”, the structure requires that no CFC rules in the residence country of the Parent 
Company apply and that the IP can be transferred without triggering high exit taxes.  
 
 
Figure 2: IP-Holding structure 
 
8 
 
Figure 2 summarizes the IP-Holding structure. The two main differences to the “Double Irish 
Dutch Sandwich” are described in the following paragraphs. 
 
(1) Avoidance of withholding tax due to the EU Interest and Royalties Directive 
The Operating Company pays royalties directly to the IP-Holding Company. No conduit 
company needs to be interposed to avoid withholding tax as the IP-Holding Company is located 
in an EU Member State and therefore the Interest and Royalties Directive applies. 
 
(2) Low taxation of the royalties at the level of the IP-Holding Company 
The royalties are not completely untaxed at the level of the IP-Holding Company. However, as 
IP Box Regimes either allow exempting a large share of royalty income from taxation or offer 
reduced tax rates for such income, the tax liability of the IP-Holding Company is very low.  
 
2.3. Summarized Findings 
The tax planning structures described in the preceding sections reveal substantial flaws in the 
existing national and international tax systems that can be summarized as follows: 
(1) A de facto waiver of residence taxation due to:  
a) no or ineffective CFC rules;  
b) a conflicting definition of tax residence in different countries; 
c) low general tax rates and special tax regimes such as IP Boxes. 
(2) No or little source taxation due to:  
a) the non-existence of withholding taxes on royalties both within the European 
Union and with respect to third countries; 
b) difficulties in the valuation of IP and relating royalty payments; 
c) a lacking taxable presence of multinationals doing business via the internet in 
customers’ residence countries. 
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3. How Significant Is the Problem? 
Beyond anecdotal evidence for companies like Google Inc., Microsoft and others, several 
attempts have been made to clarify how relevant the problem of tax avoidance really is and to 
find a proxy for the scale of base erosion and profit shifting behavior.15 Given that true profit 
margins (i.e. before any avoidance strategy that affects actually reported profits) are not 
observable by country, the clear identification of tax avoidance from available data is 
challenging and existing approaches differ fundamentally. To be very clear at the beginning: 
there exists evidence that profit shifting takes place. There is, however, no accurate estimate of 
the amount of profits shifted. 
On the one hand, there are a small number of rather rough estimates which try to derive the 
volume of profit shifting from aggregate statistics or similar sources. Although these studies 
receive great attention in public debate, their results have to be treated with caution, as we will 
explain below. On the other hand, there is a broad strand of academic research investigating 
corporate tax avoidance. The main evidence provided by this strand of literature will be 
summarized in the second part of this section.  
Starting with some stylized numbers from public debates, Richard Murphy (adviser to the Tax 
Justice Network and director of Trades Union Councils) claimed in his report “The Missing 
Billions” that GBP 12 billion of corporate income tax is lost each year due to tax avoidance by 
the 700 largest companies in the United Kingdom.16 For developing countries Oxfam, a non-
profit organization, attributes a revenue loss of USD 50 billion to tax avoidance of 
multinationals.17 Although the question of how much revenue is lost due to profit shifting is 
highly interesting for the public, methodological flaws underlying the estimates prevent them 
from being very reliable. For instance, taxable income or respectively tax payments in absence 
of tax avoidance are approximated by using profits from financial accounts multiplied by the 
statutory tax rate18 or foreign capital stocks multiplied by a deemed return and an average tax 
                                                            
15   Even if actual volumes and the dominant channels of profit shifting were known, it would still be difficult to 
draw the line between “acceptable” profit shifting activity and “aggressive” tax planning. Exploiting international 
tax differentials cannot be considered aggressive per se, as the underlying structures are not necessarily artificial. 
A definition provided by the OECD, that suggests that aggressive tax planning might not accord with the law 
(OECD (2008) p. 87) is misleading since the tax planning strategies described in section 2. are certainly in line 
with existing law. 
16  Murphy (2008). 
17  Oxfam (2000). 
18  This approach of Richard Murphy was discussed by the Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation in its 
report “The Tax Gap for Corporation Tax” pointing out that this approach rather captures differences between 
financial and tax accounting. See Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation (2012). 
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rate.19 Comparing taxable profits with these inadequate benchmarks reveals conceptual 
differences between the underlying statistics rather than the scale of profit shifting activity. 
Beyond these rough approximations of profit shifting volumes, a wealth of empirical research 
studies assesses the significance of corporate tax avoidance and its sensitivity with respect to 
international tax incentives. Turning now to this broad group of empirical approaches, two 
different strands of literature can be distinguished. The first strand of studies provides rather 
general evidence for profit shifting by asking how tax rate differentials affect reported pre-tax 
profits. In their seminal work, Grubert and Mutti as well as Hines and Rice show for the United 
States that there is indeed an empirical relationship between the profitability reported by US 
multinationals’ foreign affiliates and respective host country tax rates.20 Huizinga and Laeven 
provide evidence that reported profits of European subsidiaries depend on their specific tax 
incentives and profit shifting potential given the structure of the whole multinational group.21 
Also for Europe, Egger, Eggert and Winner directly compare tax payments of multinational 
firms and a group of domestic firms using propensity score matching and find that multinational 
firms pay substantially less taxes.22 Dharmapala and Riedel use a novel identification strategy 
by asking how a shock in earnings at the parent’s level transmits to group entities located in 
high- or low-tax countries.23 Fuest, Hebous and Riedel study income shifting through debt. 
They find that financing structures of multinational entities in developing countries react more 
sensitively to tax differences than in developed countries, suggesting that developing countries 
with high taxes may be more vulnerable to tax planning.24 
The findings of these studies strongly support the idea that multinational groups reallocate 
profits globally as to minimize the overall tax burden. Several other studies corroborate this 
conclusion although the estimated effect size differs according to the employed profit variable, 
the measure of the tax incentive and the econometric approaches. A recent quantitative survey 
of this literature is provided by Heckemeyer and Overesch.25  
 
                                                            
19  The shortcomings of this approach are discussed by Fuest and Riedel, who argue that, among other critical 
assumptions, the role of tax incentives and tax base regulations is neglected in these estimations. See Fuest/Riedel 
(2010). 
20  Grubert/Mutti (1991); Hines/Rice (1994). 
21  Huizinga/Laeven (2008). 
22  Egger/Eggert/Winner (2010). 
23  Dharmapala/Riedel (2013). 
24  Fuest/Hebous/Riedel (2011). 
25  Heckemeyer/Overesch (2013). 
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Given the general finding that profits are shifted within multinationals, the question arises 
which strategies to reallocate profits within the group can be identified empirically. This is the 
focus of the second strand of literature. In principle, profits earned in high-tax countries can be 
channeled to lower taxed group entities via debt financing or via non-financial strategies such 
as transfer pricing and licensing of IP. With respect to debt financing, Desai, Foley and Hines 
provide empirical evidence that multinationals use intra-company loans to mitigate tax 
payments of subsidiaries in high-tax locations.26 Clausing shows that intra-firm transfer prices 
for intra-group transactions are sensitive to international tax rate differentials.27 Furthermore, 
there is robust evidence that tax considerations are important for the intra-company allocation 
of intangible property.28 Desai, Foley and Hines show that large international firms with 
extensive intra-firm trade and high R&D intensities are the most likely to use tax havens.29 
Although there are good reasons to believe that transfer pricing and licensing of IP represent 
the predominant route used to shift profits abroad,30 the empirical evidence is not clear cut. 
Evaluating the general evidence for profit shifting, Heckemeyer and Overesch indeed 
corroborate the expectation of non-financial profit shifting techniques to play the most 
important role. Results by Dharmapala and Riedel instead suggest a larger effect of debt 
financing whereas the results of Grubert point to equal shares.31  
To conclude, empirical evidence on corporate tax avoidance is robust and significant. 
Moreover, it is clearly shown that both licensing and transfer pricing as well as group financing 
strategies are used to reallocate profits within the group. It is, however, less clear which strategy 
of tax avoidance is most relevant. Finally, very little is known on the actual revenue 
consequences of these strategies.  
 
4. How Would We Like International Corporate Taxation to Work? 
How we would like international corporate taxation to work depends on what we expect from 
the corporate income tax. On the one hand, corporate income taxes can be considered as a 
substitute for the personal income tax. The income tax is usually levied according to the 
                                                            
26  Desai/Foley/Hines (2004). 
27  Clausing (2003). 
28  Dischinger/Riedel (2011); Karkinsky/Riedel (2012). 
29  Desai/Foley/Hines (2006). 
30  The interest rate on intra-group loans can be directly compared to the market interest rate, profit shifting thus 
being limited to it, whereas there is, in principle, more discretion in setting transfer prices on highly specific group 
transactions as pointed out by Overesch and Schreiber, see Overesch/Schreiber (2010). 
31   Grubert (2003). 
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residence principle. Theoretically, residence-based taxation of corporate income requires direct 
apportionment of profits to the owners of a company. In practice, this is difficult to achieve. 
Profits are therefore taxed at the corporate level. Residence-based corporate taxation would thus 
imply that multinational companies are liable to tax on their accrued worldwide income. 
Accordingly, foreign subsidiaries would be treated as transparent for tax purposes. 
Alternatively, one could argue, that income tax is considered as an instrument to make firms 
pay for benefits they get from public services and other advantages provided by the country 
where they produce or sell their products. According to this concept of source taxation, resident 
corporations are not liable to tax on their worldwide income but only their domestic profits are 
subject to tax. Any foreign profits should instead be taxed where they have been generated. 
The advantages and disadvantages of these concepts have been discussed extensively in the 
literature on international taxation. No consensus has so far been reached as to which of these 
concepts is superior. Against this background, our policy considerations in section 5. take the 
existing international income tax systems as a starting point, i.e. corporate taxation is based on 
income determined by separate accounting and includes elements of both residence and source 
principle. Given that, the following principles should find widespread support: 
1. the international tax system should avoid double taxation of corporate profits; 
2. the international tax system should avoid non-taxation of corporate profits. 
These rules imply that source- and residence-based taxes can coexist, provided that taxes on 
income paid in the source country are credited in the residence country.32 Tax avoidance 
typically implies that these rules are violated. In addition, tax avoidance may distort the capital 
allocation because it distorts competition between firms with different opportunities to avoid 
taxes.  
 
5. Policies to Address Profit Shifting and “Aggressive” Tax Planning 
For tackling profit shifting and “aggressive” tax planning it is useful to distinguish four 
approaches, as explained in the introduction:  
(1) extension of residence taxation; 
(2) extension of source taxation; 
                                                            
32  Clearly, the notion that corporate income should be taxed once, rather than twice or not at all, raises the question 
whether taxation at a very low rate or even zero rating is acceptable. 
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(3) fundamental reforms of corporate income taxation; and 
(4) stricter reporting and transparency requirements. 
In this section we present specific policy options for each approach and analyse their potential 
to tackle profit shifting in general and IP-based tax planning structures as presented in section 
2. in particular. 
 
(1) Extension of residence taxation 
To avoid profit shifting by strengthening residence taxation one option is to tighten CFC rules 
so that they effectively prevent sheltering low-taxed passive income from residence taxation. 
The European Commission and the OECD consider this option. Another policy option is to 
define rules that consistently determine tax residence across countries or that at least tackle 
double non-taxation resulting from qualification conflicts. 
Both measures for strengthening residence taxation have the potential to reduce tax avoidance 
of multinationals. However, not all countries might be willing to implement them because while 
some countries lose as a result of profit shifting other countries gain. It might for example not 
be in the interest of the United States to tighten CFC rules or to change the rules for tax 
residence, because US multinational firms would then lose the competitive advantage of 
avoiding European corporate income taxes on foreign income. Also various European 
countries, among them Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom 
compete for tax bases and jobs by drastically reducing residence taxation on mobile income 
through IP Box Regimes. Hence, waiting for these countries to tighten residence taxation is not 
a realistic option.  
However, pressure could be put on countries by establishing a set of rules which prevents them 
from operating specific tax incentives like IP Box Regimes. One possibility for this is the 
existing EU Code of Conduct for business taxation.33 So far, the Code of Conduct has been 
successful since many Member States have withdrawn tax regimes considered as harmful in the 
past 15 years. However, the Code of Conduct is legally not binding and does not offer precise 
definitions of harmful tax regimes. It is therefore not clear whether the Code of Conduct covers 
IP Box Regimes. Another possibility is the application of State aid provisions by the European 
Commission to IP Box Regimes and its approval by the European Court of Justice. One has to 
                                                            
33  European Communities (1998). 
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be aware, however, that even if IP Box Regimes were ruled out, other possibilities for profit 
shifting would remain. 
 
(2) Extension of source taxation 
One possibility to strengthen source taxation is the implementation of deduction restriction rules 
for payments on intra-group contractual relations such as interest and royalty payments. Many 
countries already apply so-called thin capitalization rules or earnings-stripping rules to counter 
profit shifting via intra-group or even third-party debt financing. To tackle profit shifting via 
licensing, comparable deduction restriction rules for intra-group royalty payments could be 
introduced. Both options are included as action no. 4 in the OECD’s action plan adopted by the 
G20 in July 2013. However, the implementation of such rules has serious drawbacks. They do 
not only affect arrangements designed to avoid taxes but also arrangements which exist for 
good economic reasons. Moreover, deduction restriction rules reduce the consistency of the law 
and, in particular, often cause double taxation.34 This is because the underlying payments 
although not deductible in the source country are still considered as taxable income in the 
residence country. There is strong evidence35 that the extension of source taxation, which results 
in a definite tax burden at source, has a negative impact on investment. 
Another unilateral measure for strengthening source taxation36 is the implementation of a 
general anti-avoidance rule (so-called GAAR) into the tax code as proposed by the European 
Commission in December 2012.37 GAAR would disallow the deductibility of payments such 
as royalties and interest to tax havens under certain conditions. This policy option is also not 
recommendable due to several reasons. First, it is difficult to draw the line between a wholly 
artificial structure and one that has economic substance. Hence, it might be quite easy for 
companies to circumvent the application of GAAR. Second, it has to be emphasized that tax 
planning, even if considered as aggressive, is not illegal. Third, the effectiveness of such a rule 
depends strongly on the interpretation by the national courts, which leads to considerable 
uncertainty in the application of tax law. 
 
                                                            
34  However, for a proposal that is supposed to avoid double taxation see Lodin (2011). 
35  For surveys see de Mooij/Ederveen (2003); Feld/Heckemeyer (2011). 
36  We define it as a source country tool because it is mostly used as such. However, properly employed it can also 
be applied to strengthen residence taxation.  
37  European Commission (2012c). 
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A third possibility to particularly avoid profit shifting by licensing is to ensure an adequate 
valuation of intangible assets and relating royalty payments. With respect to the transfer of 
intangibles, this can be done by implementing an adjustment clause in the national tax code 
which provides tax authorities with the opportunity to levy additional exit taxes if the earnings 
potential turns out to be substantially higher than initially expected. Applying such a rule also 
to buy-in payments made under cost-sharing agreements and effectively ensuring its application 
could reduce the tax advantage stemming from IP tax planning strategies. Concerning the 
deductibility of royalty payments, countries need to strictly apply the arm´s length principle to 
avoid base erosion. However, as assessing arm´s length prices for intra-group royalties is very 
difficult, even a strict enforcement of the arm´s length standard does not ensure an objective 
valuation of transfer prices. Focusing on profit-based methods, like, for example, the profit split 
method to determine transfer prices might improve the arm´s length principle by making 
transfer prices more objective. As already mentioned with respect to measures for strengthening 
residence taxation, here again the problem occurs, that it might not be in the interest of all 
countries to strengthen source taxation. Ireland, for example, has few incentives to adapt its 
transfer pricing rules if companies using the existing rules create jobs for highly qualified 
employees in Ireland. 
A promising way of tackling profit shifting could be the extension of source taxation by 
imposing withholding taxes on interest and royalty payments, which then would be creditable 
in the residence country. Raising withholding taxes on both royalties paid to EU Member States 
and royalties paid to third countries would render the IP-based tax planning strategies described 
in section 2. ineffective. Moreover, an internationally coordinated extension of source taxation 
would avoid double taxation. It thereby has to be stressed, that enhancing source taxation also 
requires that residence countries credit withholding taxes. Such a reform towards more source 
taxation at the international level requires a modification of bilateral tax treaties as well as the 
EU Interest and Royalties Directive. In addition, pressure has to be put on European countries 
that do not levy withholding tax on interest (e.g. Germany) or royalties (e.g. the Netherlands) 
respectively according to their national tax law. It is surprising for us that neither the European 
Commission nor the OECD considers this option. In our view the levy of withholding taxes by 
source countries and the obligation of resident countries to credit them is – given the ongoing 
public debate – an appropriate measure to ensure that multinationals pay a fair share of taxes in 
countries where they operate. 
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Withholding taxes are less helpful when it comes to companies that do not create a taxable 
presence in countries where they carry out functions and sell their products. This is for example 
true for multinationals selling their goods via the internet. If Ireland or the Netherlands levied 
a withholding tax on royalties, this would render the “Double Irish Dutch Sandwich” structure 
void, but multinationals with online sales could still keep their effective tax rates low by 
locating their operating company in a low-tax country like Ireland and thereby avoiding a nexus 
in all other countries. Another option to enhance source taxation, which could complement 
levying withholding taxes, is therefore to ensure the recognition of a taxable presence in the 
source country. This can for example be done by adapting the concept of permanent 
establishment (PE) to the digital economy. One possibility for this is to stipulate the creation of 
a PE in the customer´s residence state upon collection of customer data.38 Another way of 
tackling the problem would be an effective collection of value added tax (VAT) in the digital 
economy as considered by the OECD (see action no. 1).  
Due to the revenue redistribution that comes along with coordinated reforms to strengthen 
source taxation, both policy options described above might also face difficulties to find broad 
international approval. Apparently, this is because if source taxation is increased, residence 
countries will at the same time lose tax revenue due to a higher amount of creditable foreign 
taxes or exempt foreign income. As long as countries or regions have no clear indication about 
how much they will gain and lose in tax revenue due to the extension of source taxation on 
capital imports and the reduction of residence taxation of capital exports it is therefore not clear 
whether measures to prevent “aggressive” tax planning are actually desirable. Here, further 
research on the revenue implications is necessary. 
 
(3) Fundamental reforms of corporate income taxation 
Profit shifting can also be addressed by fundamental reforms of the international tax system. 
Currently, the separate entity principle based on transfer prices following the arm’s length 
standard prevails. As described above, the enforcement of the arm´s length standard often fails 
due to the high specificity of intra-firm goods. Therefore, the European Commission proposed 
to replace the system of separate accounting by formula apportionment.39 According to the 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), the income of a group is consolidated 
and split between tax authorities according to a formula that includes proportional assets, 
                                                            
38  See Collin/Colin (2013). 
39  European Commission (2011). 
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payroll and sales. Within the European Union this concept makes determining transfer prices 
for tax purposes obsolete and avoids the related measurement problems. However, defining the 
elements of the formula as well as their respective weights is a controversial issue and the 
determination of transfer prices remains necessary for transactions at the boundaries of the 
European Union. Although formula apportionment will mitigate important shortcomings of 
separate accounting, it will, at the same time, create new distortions.40 Beyond concerns against 
a formula apportionment from a theoretical point of view it has to be stressed, however, that in 
particular the sales factor in such a formula could turn out to be very robust against profit 
shifting since the consumer market of multinationals cannot be manipulated.41 
An alternative approach would be to introduce a destination-based cash flow tax which ties 
taxation of corporations to the location of consumption.42 Again, as for a CCCTB, the appeal 
of this concept is that consumption is likely to be less mobile and more difficult to manipulate 
for tax purposes than income.  
Both fundamental reform options are promising and may solve central problems of the current 
tax system. However, the optimal design of such rules has to be elaborated further and there is 
currently no consensus between countries in sight about either of these reform options. Hence, 
the more fundamental approaches are not an appropriate measure to tackle profit shifting in the 
short-run. Rather, they would require a huge reform effort and need a considerable degree of 
international coordination and harmonization. It could even turn out that either a CCCTB or a 
destination-based cash flow tax has to be implemented on a worldwide basis. It is therefore not 
surprising that fundamental reforms of income taxation are not on the agenda of either the 
European Commission or the OECD. 
 
(4) Stricter reporting and transparency requirements 
As a fourth approach to tackle profit shifting and tax avoidance we should mention an entirely 
different policy option: a change in reporting and publicity rules regarding taxes paid by 
multinational companies. One proposal in this respect, the so-called country-by-country 
reporting, was initially brought forward by civil society organizations43 and is now also 
                                                            
40  See Devereux (2004); Altshuler/Grubert (2010); Hines (2010). 
41  For a proposal to adopt a formulary profit split using a sales only formula see Avi-Yonah/Clausing/Durst (2009). 
For a critical evaluation of destination sales formula apportionment see Morse (2010). 
42  See Bond/Devereux (2002); Auerbach/Devereux/Simpson (2010). For an evaluation of legal issues associated 
with this proposal see also generally Shay/Summers (1997). 
43  The idea was first developed by Richard Murphy, a former chartered accountant working for Tax Justice 
Network and other civil society organizations. 
18 
 
discussed in certain countries (e.g. Germany)44 and at the level of the European Union.45 Such 
a measure would require multinationals to publicly disclose data on the financial performance 
like sales, purchases, labour costs and number of employees, financing costs, pre-tax profits, 
nature and value of assets and the tax charge split between current and deferred tax to the public 
on a country-by-country basis. In this context it is important to distinguish between reporting 
to the tax authorities and public disclosure of tax information. The main objective of country-
by-country reporting proposals is to achieve public disclosure.  
Proponents of this approach essentially pursue two objectives. First, companies may be held 
accountable for the amount of tax they pay or fail to pay in individual countries. Second, 
governments and their tax administrations may be held accountable for the way in which they 
treat multinational investors. Whether public debate about taxes paid by multinationals in 
different countries can act as a substitute for legislation or whether it creates pressure for 
governments to improve tax legislation is an open question. Additional open issues are related 
to the objective and justification, legal aspects and the mechanism for disclosure of country-by-
country reporting.46 
Objective and justification 
Country-by-country reporting was initially discussed as an option to increase transparency in 
the extractive industries (e.g. oil, gas and mining industries) for developing countries. Revenues 
from natural resources are an important source of income for these countries. The view here is 
that governments in developing countries find it extremely difficult to collect taxes from certain 
large companies. Transparency in this respect might be useful in combating corruption. 
Whether combating corruption justifies the extension of country-by-country reporting to other 
industry-sectors is a controversial issue. Profit shifting and tax planning – even if considered as 
aggressive – is not per se against the law. Moreover, there are certainly many taxpayers other 
than multinationals (in particular individuals) conducting tax planning and income shifting. To 
be consistent, countries would thus need to tighten transparency requirements also for these 
groups of taxpayers. Nonetheless, if there are unintended gaps or loopholes in the tax laws, 
then, above all, the legislator has to remove them. As pointed out in section 2. and discussed 
above, many gaps and loopholes as well as the measures for closing them are well known. 
                                                            
44  See Fraktionen SPD und BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, note 8, suggesting a country-by-country reporting for 
multinational investors in Germany. 
45  Brunsden (2013). 
46  For a detailed discussion of county-by-country reporting see Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation 
(2011). 
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Legal aspects 
Country-by-country reporting has to consider legal restrictions. Here, first of all, the 
confidentiality of tax returns in most countries around the globe has to be mentioned. Moreover, 
the competitive position of multinationals could be jeopardized if country-by-country reporting 
is not a universal standard. In addition, it could be possible that such information is 
misinterpreted and, hence, increases the reputational risk of multinationals. 
Mechanism for disclosure 
Advocates of country-by-country reporting propose as an instrument for disclosure the 
consolidated financial accounts of multinationals, possibly by an extension of the segmental 
reporting requirements laid down in the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
Again, here, several concerns arise. First, it is doubtful that consolidated financial accounts are 
the proper instrument for country-by-country reporting since these accounts are supposed to 
provide decision useful information about the group of companies as a whole single entity. 
Second, like other accounting standards such as US-GAAP, IFRS follow a forward-looking 
approach, while country-by-country tax reporting is strictly backward-looking. This is relevant 
for example if deferred taxes are required to be reported. This part of the total tax charge is 
based on reliable expectations about the future. Third, accounting standards already prescribe 
considerable reporting requirements such as segmental reporting and the tax reconciliation. This 
is done by a regional or product-based reporting. There is, however, no obligation to report 
about the tax charge in such a detail as proposed by country-by-country reporting. This aspect 
relates to the legal restrictions mentioned above. Therefore, a special disclosure form separate 
from financial accounts seems to be more adequate. Again, legal concerns remain if this 
information was made available to the public. 
To summarize, the objectives and the justification of stricter reporting and transparency 
requirements for multinationals are vague. Moreover, depending on how the reporting 
requirements are implemented, there may be a trade-off between the administrative effort and 
cost of country-by-country reporting and the potential benefit in terms of improved tax 
compliance. A potentially more efficient way to push back tax avoidance by collecting more 
information on tax planning strategies would be to implement a “disclosure of tax avoidance 
schemes-regime” as already exists in the United Kingdom47 and some other countries and which 
requires tax advisers to disclose the tax planning structures they sell to their customers. 
                                                            
47  The regime was introduced in 2004, for details see HM Revenue & Customs (2013). 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
This article contributes to the recent debate on tackling profit shifting and tax avoidance and 
aggressive tax planning strategies by multinational firms.  
Profit shifting and tax planning – even if considered as aggressive – are not violations of the 
law, even if they are in conflict with what was intended. As described for prominent IP-based 
profit shifting models, multinational investors benefit from gaps or loopholes in the tax laws. 
Many gaps and loopholes are well known. It is up to tax legislators to remove them.  
There is solid empirical evidence demonstrating that profit shifting does indeed take place. The 
scale of profit shifting and the impact on tax revenue are difficult to measure, but it is plausible 
that the tax revenue losses are significant, as are the competitive distortions between firms 
which, due to their particular characteristics, differ in the opportunities to avoid taxes. 
As a guideline for policies against tax avoidance by multinational firms, we suggest that the 
international tax system should at the same time avoid double taxation and non-taxation of 
corporate profits. 
Measures directed against profit shifting which are currently discussed, including the measures 
suggested by the European Commission and the OECD, can be summarized under the following 
four headings: 
(1) extension of residence taxation; 
(2) extension of source taxation; 
(3) fundamental reforms of corporate income taxation; and 
(4) stricter reporting and transparency requirements. 
Our findings suggest that the enforcement of residence taxation is a difficult task, mainly 
because some countries are likely to be reluctant to move into this direction and unilateral action 
can only address certain forms of income shifting.  
The extension of source taxation seems to be more promising. Here, anti-avoidance measures, 
like deduction restriction rules for interest and royalty payments or a general anti-avoidance 
rule (GAAR) are not recommended, as the first may cause double taxation and the second is 
likely to be ineffective.  
In the short-run, we especially recommend to impose new or to extend existing withholding 
taxes on interest and royalty payments. This measure effectively tackles currently used tax 
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planning structures and does not distort investment decisions as long as withholding taxes are 
credited in the residence country. Surprisingly, such a proposal is neither on the current agenda 
of the European Commission nor of the OECD. Since the redistribution of tax revenues between 
countries will be affected by imposing withholding taxes, it is, however, not clear whether this 
measure is desirable and whether countries are actually willing to crowd back tax avoidance. 
Here, further research on the revenue implications is necessary.  
For the longer perspective, we recommend to investigate the more fundamental approaches 
such as the destination-based cash flow tax or the CCCTB with regard to changes of the 
international system of income taxation, the allocation of taxing rights as well as the 
enforcement of the tax and the resulting revenue implications in greater detail.  
Whether stricter reporting and transparency requirements for multinational companies are a 
promising way forward is not clear. The objectives are still vague. Moreover, in particular a 
country-by-country reporting faces considerable legal constraints and a mechanism for 
disclosure has to be elaborated before conclusions can be drawn about the impact of this 
proposal on the taxation of multinational firms. 
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